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In the aftermath of the financial crash of 2008, 
policy makers operating in international financial 
regulatory networks discovered macroprudential 
regulation (MPR), but macroprudential regulation 
has had a stunted or arrested development that 
can be explained with reference to five factors 
that are recounted in this article. 
Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crash of 2008, policy 
makers operating in international financial regulatory 
networks discovered macroprudential regulation (MPR) 
and ‘systemic risk’. Indeed, the widespread recognition 
that financial regulation needed to become more ‘macro-
prudential’ was one of the primary regulatory reform im-
pulses to emerge in the post-crash period. During 2009 
the G20 leaders and their finance ministers and central 
bankers provided political support and endorsement of 
macroprudential regulation, highlighting the procyclical-
ity of financial markets and the need for counter cycli-
cal regulatory policies (G20 2009a, 2009b). The newly 
expanded and renovated Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
was given a mandate to develop macroprudential analy-
sis and to monitor and report on macroprudential policy 
developments from 2009 onwards. A spate of reports 
produced by the European Commission, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), the G30, the Geneva Com-
mission, the G20 and the FSB all called for the develop-
ment of macroprudential regulation. Post-crash therefore, 
there was a rapid ideational shift in a macroprudential 
direction as an international consensus emerged which 
repeatedly endorsed the message that national authori-
ties should try to construct macroprudential regulatory 
regimes and that the analytical and research machinery 
of various international institutions and bodies should be 
reoriented to support such efforts by focusing on macro-
prudential analysis and data collection. 
The first part of this article introduces this macropru-
dential ideational shift and argues that macroprudential 
was and is a new regulatory philosophy that was substan-
tively different from the pre-crash orthodoxy based on 
notions of efficient markets (Baker 2013). Its rise to prom-
inence was only possible because it was already being 
promoted by a number of key individuals in international 
regulatory networks. These individuals or ‘norm entrepre-
neurs’ were largely well placed technocrats linked to cen-
tral banks, or central bank networks and they found that 
the general climate of opinion in their own networks and 
the wider political climate was far more receptive to their 
ideas in the post-crash period (Baker 2013). This enabled 
macroprudential ideas to rise to prominence quite rapidly 
in the aftermath of the financial crash of 2008, but the 
process of translating these ideas into concrete regulatory 
practice has proceeded slowly and incrementally (Baker 
2014). Consequently, macroprudential regulation has 
had a stunted or arrested development. The rest of this 
article sets out to explain why this has been the case, but 
also points out that macroprudential regulation is here 
to stay and is unlikely to go away, despite some political 
difficulties with putting these ideas into practice. In this 
sense, building macroprudential regulatory regimes is 
likely to be long term project spanning a decade or more. 
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The first reason for the stunted development of macro-
prudential regulation, relates to the mechanics of filling 
a new technocratic policy frame with functioning policy 
instruments. How that process proceeds depends on a 
process of gradual testing, experimentation, analysis, re-
flection and learning by an emerging cadre of macropru-
dential technocrats, who are by nature cautious. A second 
reason relates to the counter cyclical nature of macropru-
dential policy and the state of the international financial 
and banking system which remains overleveraged and the 
wider macroeconomy in which credit remains far from 
plentiful. Much macroprudential policy will only become 
apparent in the upswing phase of the credit cycle and is 
therefore time dependent. Thirdly, there remains much 
disagreement about how far macroprudential rationales 
should be extended to change existing business models 
and the structures of the financial system. These argu-
ments remain to be played out. A fourth reason relates to 
inter-state disagreement and positions that have slowed 
the process of macroprudential policy formation and have 
given the process of developing macroprudential thinking 
a very uneven quality. Finally, contests over institutional 
turf and private sector reticence, have also slowed and 
diluted the process of macroprudential policy formation. 
These factors should not be viewed as being in opposition 
to one another, or competing with one another . They co-
exist and are interacting to produce a slow and protracted 
process of macroprudential regulatory regime formation, 
in which substantive policy content is often diluted as a 
consequence of the interaction of these factors. 
The Macroprudential Ideational Shift
Macroprudential policy is a new ideology and 
a big idea. That befits what is, without 
question, a big crisis. There are a great many 
unanswered questions before this ideology 
can be put into practice. These questions will 
shape the intellectual and public policy 
debate over the next several decades, just as 
the great depression shaped the macroeco-
nomic policy debate from the 1940s to the 
early 1970s (Haldane 2009-1).
Macroprudential regulation is, as the Bank of England’s 
Director of Financial Stability, Andrew Haldane notes, a 
series of new, or different, ideas about how to regulate the 
international financial system. At its core is the notion of 
systemic risk. This is the idea that the build-up of risk in 
the financial system has a systemic dimension that goes 
beyond any individual institution’s risk profile to include 
the systemic dynamics produced by the interaction of 
aggregate debt exposures. Containing this build-up of 
risk therefore, requires a macro systemic view and policy 
stance, with regulators mandated to check these systemic 
risks. This contrasts with the pre-crisis regulatory status 
quo that essentially involved supervisors assessing the 
risk models of individual financial institutions. Such an 
approach was referred to as ‘microprudential’, but it has 
subsequently been asserted that the focus on individual 
institutions was blind to the build-up of systemic risks 
(FSA 2009, Persaud 2009). Macroprudential regulation 
therefore involves system wide policies that seek to con-
tain and constrain private sector risk taking. According 
to the former director of the Bank for International Sett-
lements, Andrew Crocket, a macroprudential approach, 
involves a focus on the financial system as a whole, so as 
to limit the costs of financial distress in terms of macro-
economic output (Crockett 2000). Such a stance involves 
regulatory intervention into the activities of private finan-
cial markets, including placing a notional ceiling on the 
rate of credit expansion and activist efforts to slow asset 
inflation.
Four constituent concepts provide the intellectual 
underpinning for MPR. First, is the notion of a fallacy 
of composition (Borio 2011), or the idea that it is ag-
gregate or collective systemic outcomes that matter more 
than individual incentives and courses of action. Second, 
within the macroprudential frame, financial markets 
are seen to be procyclical, with market prices inherently 
predisposed to extreme movements and volatility (Bo-
rio, Furfine & Lowe 2001, Borio & White 2004, White 
2006, BIS 2006). Third, market participants are prone 
to ‘herding,’ or adopting behaviours close to the overall 
mean, as they suspend their judgment, based on an ob-
servation of and deferral to the judgment and behaviours 
of others. A fourth and final macroprudential concept 
relates to the linkages and externalities that proliferate 
in complex systems. As complexity and interconnections 
increase, evident in shadow banking and financial inno-
vation for example, externalities proliferate, meaning that 
relatively small unexpected events can generate increas-
ingly costly explosions and systemic instability and fragil-
ity (Alessandri & Haldane 2009; Haldane 2010; Haldane 
& May 2011; Taleb & Blyth 2011). Moreover, a branch 
of literature points out that the excessive complexity such 
interconnections engender, often exceeds the capacity for 
human cognition, making risk incalculable (Best 2010; 
Blyth 2011; Haldane 2010; Turner 2011). Analysis of this 
kind provides a powerful rationale to move the perim-
eter of regulation to cover shadow banking, but also to 
modularise or separate financial activities, through Glass-
Stegall type legislation, to tax and even prohibit certain 
financial activities and transactions, because their social 
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costs in terms of lost output can exceed any economic 
value they generate (Haldane 2010; Tucker 2010; Turner 
2011) Fallacy of composition, procyclicality and herding 
all have an intellectual heritage that can be traced to the 
work of Keynes and Minsky, both of whom advocated a 
much more interventionist policy stance in relation to the 
financial system, than the dominant orthodoxy or norm 
of the last thirty years (Datz 2013; Baker 2013). 
Intellectually, macroprudential thinking and regula-
tory philosophy represents quite a movement away from 
the pre-crash orthodoxy. Largely this took its intellectual 
lead from Eugene Fama’s efficient markets hypothesis 
(Fama 1991). From this perspective financial markets 
efficiently process available information, while the self-
interested rational decision making of investors, meant 
that financial markets tended towards equilibrium. Con-
sequently, the principal pre-crash international financial 
governance challenge was the question of how to increase 
available information to market participants, so that they 
could make more informed investment decisions. This 
rationale and mode of thinking, informed the response to 
the Mexican peso and Asian financial crises of the 1990s 
and the launch of the international financial architec-
tural exercises, which were intended to promote the norm 
of ‘transparency’ and increased data release by national 
authorities (Baker 2006; Blyth 2003). Macroprudential 
thinking however represents a considerable rupture with 
such an approach and provides a multi-faceted challenge 
to efficient market theory. For example, fallacy of com-
position challenges the notion that the rational incentives 
of individual actors are sufficient to generate financial 
stability. Procyclicality raises the prospect that financial 
market prices are prone to extreme swings rather than 
usually being correct. Herding challenges the notion that 
individuals have the capacity and inclination to rationally 
evaluate all information, while complex systems analy-
sis indicates that complex innovative financial systems 
can be a cause of systemic instability and fragility rather 
than enhancing durability, as per the market completion 
hypothesis. 
In this sense, the crash of 2008 acted as an event that 
provided a host of empirical evidence that was damag-
ing to the efficient markets position, but provided sup-
port for a macroprudential perspective. Following the 
collapse of Lehmans in September 2008, the extreme 
downward movement in a number of interrelated asset 
classes was difficult to explain through an efficient mar-
kets lens. From this perspective systematic mistakes by 
markets (as the sum of individual rational decisions), as 
opposed to isolated random ones, could not happen, at 
least when adequate information was available, because 
optimising agents would drive prices into equilibrium. In 
contrast, the macroprudential approach that emphasised 
the importance of systemic thinking and highlighted the 
procyclical and unstable tendencies of financial markets, 
provided a readymade conceptual apparatus for explain-
ing the events of autumn 2008. This conceptual approach 
also critiqued the dominance of the existing orthodox 
and its overreliance on Value at Risk (VaR) models, as-
serting that such an approach was a cause of the crisis, 
that had further ‘hard wired’ procyclicality into the fi-
nancial system (FSA 2009). In this context, the existing 
orthodoxy became part of the problem that had to be re-
placed with new thinking. As Claudio Borio of the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS), the institution that 
pioneered the term macroprudential in the late 1970s and 
began a macroprudential research programme after the 
Asian financial crisis, has commented, „a decade ago the 
term macroprudential was barely used and there was little 
appetite amongst policy makers and regulators to even 
engage with the concept, let alone strengthening macro-
prudential regulation“ (Borio 2009: 32). Today however 
Borio has noted that „we are all macroprudentialists 
now.“ „This swell of support [for macroprudential regula-
tion] could not have been anticipated even as recently as 
a couple of years ago. The current financial crisis has been 
instrumental in underpinning it“ (Borio 2009: 2). 
Macroprudential ideas had been, „evolving quietly in 
the background, known only amongst a small but grow-
ing inner circle of cognoscenti“ (Borio 2011: 1). Macro-
prudential ideas consequently had a prior intellectual and 
institutional presence, particularly at the BIS, but also 
amongst a select number of other economists and central 
bankers, which meant that many advocates of macropru-
dential thinking were well positioned and already had a 
presence in the established financial technocratic research 
and report writing machinery that politicians called upon 
to provide them with diagnoses, answers and proposals in 
relation to the financial crash of 2008. As Walter Mattli 
and Ngaire Woods have pointed out, „successful [regula-
tory] change is made more likely where new ideas provide 
a way to regulate that both offers a common ground to 
a coalition of entrepreneurs pressing for change and fits 
well with not-discredited existing institutions.“ (Mattli & 
Woods 2009: 4-5). Macroprudential proposals had not 
discredited institutional and individual backers that were 
already linked into key policy making networks in the 
form of Borio’s inner circle of cognoscenti. In this respect, 
following the financial implosion of 2008, macropruden-
tial advocates were not starting from scratch. Individu-
als such as Borio and his BIS colleague William White, 
were already recognised and positioned within key policy 
networks, with a prior track record of advancing macro-
prudential ideas for nearly decade. The macroprudential 
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perspective therefore enjoyed an advantage in terms of 
institutional access and a body of prior work that outlined 
the inadequacies of the prior efficient markets orthodoxy 
and was well positioned to fill the vacuum left by the ap-
parent collapse in efficient market thinking. 
The rise to prominence of macroprudential was the 
result of a proactive promotional strategy by a relatively 
small number of key macroprudential norm entrepre-
neurs (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998), who engaged in 
a public process of diagnosis, persuasion and prescrip-
tion. For example, in the UK, economists John Eatwell, 
Charles Goodhart and Avinash Persaud, converted Adair 
Turner, the new head regulator of the Financial Services 
Aauthority (FSA), to the macroprudential cause in brief-
ings during the summer of 2008. Turner became one of 
the most forceful and eloquent advocates of the macro-
prudential position and began to make the macropruden-
tial case at the meetings of the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF, later FSB) in Basel1.
As the FSF prepared reports for G20 meetings, 
macroprudential references and thinking also began to 
find their way into G20 communiques, albeit somewhat 
cryptically under the heading ‘mitigating procyclicality’ 
with support expressed for countercyclical capital buff-
ers, for the first time in the Horsham communiqué of 
2009 (G20 2009a). William White, formerly a promi-
nent macroprudential pioneer at the BIS had now retired, 
but was advising and briefing the German G20 team, and 
also briefing Canadian officials using the frame of MPR 
analysis (Balzil & Schissel 2009). The increased access to 
the levers of national state policy making that macropru-
dential advocates enjoyed in Euro zone states, the UK 
and Canada, enabled the outlines of a macroprudential 
consensus to be built through the G20 and the FSB. A 
crucial G20 working group on regulation in early 2009 
chaired by the Canadian central bank official Tiff Mack-
lem and the Reserve Bank of India Governor Rakesh 
Mokan, produced a report calling for macroprudential 
regulation, and crucially Canada in the form of a leverage 
ratio and India in the form of some countercyclical capi-
tal requirements had both pioneered and experimented 
with key macroprudential instruments in the pre-crash 
period. By the summer of 2009 the new FSB was calling 
on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
to commence work on countercyclical capital buffers, 
and it was agreed that a new Basel III agreement with a 
macroprudential component would be negotiated.
The significance of this post-crash macroprudential 
ideational shift was that policy makers’ cognitive filter 
switched to a different setting. Policy makers are now 
using various combinations of the four key constituent 
concepts of fallacy of composition, procyclicality, herd-
ing, and complex externalities to inform and guide regu-
latory initiatives and practice. A whole range of policy 
proposals could now be placed on the table and seriously 
discussed, that were previously out of reach. These have 
included: countercyclical capital requirements; dynamic 
loan loss provisioning; countercyclical liquidity require-
ments; administrative caps on aggregate lending; reserve 
requirements; limits on leverage in asset purchases; loan 
to value ratios for mortgages; loan to income ratios; mini-
mum margins on secured lending; transaction taxes; con-
straints on currency mismatches; capital controls; and 
host country regulation (Elliot 2011). The macropruden-
tial shift, therefore represents a potential trajectory change 
in financial regulation. After three decades of entrusting 
more and more autonomy to private actors to price and 
manage their own risk, that trajectory, is potentially, at 
least, reversed. Macroprudential concepts potentially em-
power regulators by providing them with the intellectual 
equipment to set limits to market activities, reducing the 
scale and restricting the scope of financial transacting 
(Turner, 2011). However, to date macroprudential policy 
development has proceeded slowly. The macroprudential 
regulatory philosophy has not yet translated into a sub-
stantively different approach to financial regulation. Its 
rise to prominence has been characterized by a stunted 
or arrested development. The rest of this article outlines 
the reasons for this stunted development. 
The Stunted Development of Macroprudential 
Policy
The task of translating macroprudential concepts and rea-
soning into concrete regulatory practice and functioning 
macroprudential policy instruments has been proceeding 
slowly. Part of the reasons for this relate to the very nature 
of the macroprudential project itself, but also the pat-
terns of political contestation surrounding macropruden-
tial regulation. Five factors that have slowed and diluted 
macroprudential policy development are identified here. 
Macroprudential as a technocratic control project
As the last section illustrated macroprudential policy was 
something that was largely conceived of by technocrats 
at central banks and the BIS. The project of construct-
ing macroprudential regulation is something that has not 
only been driven and promoted by technocrats, but also 
involves an expansion of their role in the policy process 
and rests on the exercise of their expertise and informed 
judgement. For example, the stated objective of macro-
prudential policy is to moderate credit supply over the 
cycle, tightening policy in a boom and lowering it in a 
bust (Bank of England 2011). The most commonly cited 
macroprudential policy instrument is the counter cycli-
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cal capital buffer, a variant of which had operated in the 
Spanish and Indian banking systems in the pre-crash pe-
riod. The idea behind a counter cyclical capital buffer is 
to lean against the credit cycle based on a reference path 
of a normalized credit to GDP ratio. Deviations above 
the path involve a tightening of capital requirements for 
private lending institutions, while deviations below that 
path should involve a loosening of those requirements 
(Haldane 2012). A functioning macroprudential policy 
regime therefore clearly requires regulators who have the 
capacity and capability to identify normalized paths of 
credit to GDP and deviations from that path, based on 
extrapolations from previous evidence and data. Further, 
they would also be required to reach judgements on the 
precise calibrations of these macroprudential policy in-
struments and how they should be scaled up or down 
to reflect particular identified phases of the credit cycle. 
Such a process clearly depends upon the technical capac-
ity of regulators to reach such calculations, the data sets 
and data collection techniques they have to hand and 
some discretionary powers to reach judgments on how 
policy should be adjusted. One aim of the macropruden-
tial project it has been claimed therefore is ‘technocratic 
mastery of financial markets,’ driven by a desire to open 
new possibilities for control of complex adaptive financial 
networks, through mathematized control technologies 
(Erturk et al. 2011).
 Prior to the financial crash of 2008 there were rela-
tively few functioning examples of macroprudential pol-
icy instruments. The Spanish example of counter cyclical 
capital buffers or dynamic provisioning, and Canadian 
use of leverage limits were outliers in developed country 
financial systems, although a number of Asian systems 
sought to constrain lending and investment activities us-
ing macroprudential type financial stability justifications, 
without actually naming them as such (Borio 2011). Bank 
of England officials have noted, ‘the state of macropru-
dential policy resembles the state of monetary policy just 
after the second world war, with patchy data, incomplete 
theory and negligible experience, meaning that MPR will 
be conducted by trial and error’ (Aikman, Haldane & 
Nelson 2011: 1). Macroprudential policy authorities, as 
Haldane acknowledges will not be able to draw on dec-
ades of research and experience. Consequently, macro-
prudential policy is so new, and experience with it is 
so limited, that we have entered a very fluid phase of 
policy experimentation based on trial and error. The FSB/ 
IMF/ BIS report to G20 leaders (FSB, IMF, BIS 2011) 
on macroprudential policy, described systemic risk iden-
tification as a ‘nascent field, that requires fundamental 
applied research, so as to inform the collection of analysis 
and data, to fill data gaps and to lead to the development 
of better models’. Furthermore, newly introduced tools, 
the report suggests, will need to be tried out in different 
circumstances and their performance evaluated against 
expectations, as macroprudential institutions are still be-
ing introduced nationally and there is no experience of 
the performance of these institutions to guide their de-
sign. The report is clear in stating that, ‘there is no widely 
agreed and comprehensive theoretical framework for the 
optimal choice and calibration of macroprudential tools. 
It is still too early to provide a definite assessment of the 
set of macroprudential tools that will provide most useful 
further down the road, in part because financial innova-
tion and change within the financial system will give rise 
to new risks in due course’ (FSB, IMF, BIS 2011: 9-10) 
Ultimately, macroprudential policy development has 
been informed by its character as an almost exclusively 
technocratic project, that initially took the form of an 
‘insider’s coup d’etat’, primarily driven forward by tech-
nocrats whose aim is to achieve technocratic mastery of 
financial markets, by ‘rethinking’ and ‘mapping’ the fi-
nancial network (Erturk et al. 2011).
By their nature technocrats like to proceed cautiously 
on the basis of data sets and empirical evidence, which 
take time to accumulate. Consequently, the task of fill-
ing macroprudential regulators’ empty policy arsenal is 
proceeding gradually as evidence, data and rationales are 
compiled and tested, as the reports above illustrate. This 
itself is a slow, gradual process, but it also illuminates how 
the character of the macroprudential project has been 
shaped by its technocratic character in ways which have 
slowed the pace of its development to date.
The counter cyclical nature of macroprudential policies
The specific countercyclical objectives of macropruden-
tial regulation, as time variable policies means that their 
more interventionist and restrictive character, which re-
quire institutions to set more capital aside as macro credit 
supply expands, only become conspicuous at certain parts 
of the economic cycle. The crucial test for macropruden-
tial policy will be how it deals with inflating credit and 
asset bubbles and its ability to restrain private lending, 
investing and transacting in such circumstances. To date 
de-leveraging activities and the limited supply of credit to 
the real economy have been used as arguments to mini-
mise regulatory requirements. For example, this was par-
ticularly evident in the case of the Basel III agreement, 
– a set of international regulatory principles negotiated 
by central bankers in the aftermath of the financial crash 
to update the earlier Basel II. Bank of England officials 
developed a macroprudential argument to make the case 
for a more expansive stance on capital ratios in Basel III, 
arguing that capital requirements needed to be set far 
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above any reasonable estimate of the losses likely to be 
incurred by an individual bank, because what mattered 
was the macro systemic stability of credit supply, not just 
the risk of individual failure (Turner 2011; Miles, Yang & 
Marcheggiano 2011). Basel III capital ratios they claimed 
would therefore ideally be 15-20% of risk weighted assets, 
rather than the increase from 2 to 7 per cent in Basel III 
(Miles, Yang & Marcheggiano 2011; Turner 2011). The 
objective of moving towards 15-20 per cent is however 
viewed as a long term one, because ‘while higher equity 
ratios would not in the long run carry an economic pen-
alty, a starting point of sub optimally high leverage means 
that higher equity ratios could slow recovery from a cri-
sis induced recession’ (Turner 2011.) This argument was 
accepted by more ambitious macroprudentialists such as 
Adair Turner and the BIS macroeconomic assessment 
group, whose analysis informed Basel III design. In this 
sense, macroprudentialists acute sensitivity to the need 
for countercyclical policies means that in the current 
circumstances they have accepted lower capital require-
ments in the short term, but view the task of building 
adequate capital requirements standards as unfinished 
business that will require raising requirements over the 
longer term as a necessary measure for long run financial 
stability. 
Disagreements on the risk weighting system and the uni-
versal banking model
The Basel III agreement also maintained the centrality 
of so called risk weighted assets and the internal risk 
models of large banks through their complex sophisti-
cated Value at Risk models (VaR), which involve banks 
assessing their own risks so as to determine the bank’s 
minimum capital requirements. Those sceptical of banks’ 
ability to model their own financial risk, from within the 
macroprudential camp were not in a position to persuade 
either the industry or the rest of the international regula-
tory community to jettison a risk weight asset approach 
in the Basel III agreement. This fundamental component 
of Basel II remains unaltered therefore, with Basel III 
adding a mandatory capital conservation buffer of 2.5% 
and a discretionary countercyclical capital buffer of 2.5%, 
during periods of high credit growth. Once the macro-
prudential ideational shift had taken hold by late 2009, 
industry representatives were in no position to prevent or 
oppose a countercyclical element being introduced into 
the Basel principles. In this sense, Basel III adds to Basel 
II rather than replacing it in its entirety, meaning that 
Basel III retains many of the features of Basel II, in a 
form of path dependent policy ‘layering’ (Baker 2014; 
Mahoney & Thelen 2010). 
The issue of risk weighted asset calculations recently 
came to public attention, when Andrew Haldane of the 
Bank of England criticised the Basel III agreement for 
producing an overly complex approach to financial regu-
lation because of its reliance on risk weighted assets. In 
his ‘Dog and Frisbee’ speech at the most prestigious event 
in the annual central bank conference calendar, the Jack-
son Hole Conference of the Kansas City Federal Reserve 
(Haldane & Madorous 2012; Masters 2012), Haldane 
made the argument that the shift to a highly-complex 
risk-weighting system for bank assets had resulted in the 
average amount of capital banks assigned to those as-
sets halving over the previous 20 years, because com-
plex rules have generated both the incentives and the 
means to exploit regulatory loopholes. Consequently, he 
asserted that simple measures of bank leverage, untainted 
by such complexity, were better at predicting banking 
failure than complex regulatory alternatives (Haldane & 
Madouros 2012). 
Unfortunately, fellow macroprudentialist, Mark Car-
ney, who recently become Haldane’s superior at the Bank 
of England, may agree that regulatory policy needs to be 
more countercyclical and recognises the importance of 
leverage ratios, but does not agree with Haldane’s criti-
cisms of Basel III. In particular Carney argues that risk 
weighting of assets and a leverage ratio need to work in 
tandem, with the leverage ratio acting as an additional 
layer of protection from a miscalibration of risk weights, 
rather than replacing risk weights altogether. Using the 
leverage ratio as the frontline of defence, would Carney 
asserts, result in institutions filling the leverage ratio with 
the riskiest assets (Verma 2012). In this sense, two of the 
officials who have done most to promote, support and 
develop a macroprudential approach disagree on the role 
of risk weighted assets, with Carney’s position currently 
winning the day, in part because of his pivotal position 
as chair of the FSB, that exercises some oversight of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that formu-
lated the Basel III agreement. Furthermore, Carney is 
less the convinced about the problems of the universal 
banking model, and has been openly sceptical about the 
practicalities of the Volcker rule in the United States and 
its ability to achieve segmentation, or the desirability of 
doing so (Verma 2012). This position contrasts with Hal-
dane’s view that structural change is required, involving 
robust separation of retail and investment banking arms. 
Haldane’s position in part arises from a macroprudential 
orientation which is sensitive to complexity and size as a 
spreader of risk and instability. This has been particularly 
evident in his collaborations with Oxford Professor of 
Zoology, Robert May, which compares banking systems 
to ecosystems and suggesting that intertwined; complex 
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systems are less robust and less stable than simpler modu-
larised systems (Haldane & May 2011). Haldane conse-
quently supports ring fencing, with full separation as the 
next logical step (Haldane 2012, 7). Haldane is quite 
clear that such separation is not just about reducing the 
size and costs of future financial shocks, but also ensuring 
and delivering a more stable and steady supply of credit 
to real economy activities. 
Despite the fact that macroprudentialists such as Hal-
dane and Carney share much common ground therefore, 
on two of the most crucial issues relating to the structure 
of the financial system, which would challenge existing 
business models, prominent macroprudentialists cannot 
agree and are unable to form a decisive coalition to push 
for long term structural change in the financial system. 
The differences between Haldane and Carney are symp-
tomatic of this division. 
Inter State Disagreement
An obvious and conspicuous interstate disagreement was 
evident in the Basel III negotiations. While the, US, UK 
and Swiss representatives argued for a much higher eq-
uity capital ratio (Hanson, Kashyap & Stein 2011), EU 
regulators wanted lower requirements, fearing this would 
disadvantage their ailing banks. An inter-state, or inter 
jurisdictional contest in which actors sought to gain com-
petitive advantage for their own financial sector therefore 
diluted Basel III ( Helleiner 2012; Mugge & Stellinga 
2010). National differences are also evident in relation to 
a number of macroprudential concepts and policy instru-
ments. For example, US acceptance of the macropruden-
tial approach, has according to senior international offi-
cials, always been ‘half-hearted and quite partial’, partly 
for „philosophical“ reasons, relating to a faith in markets. 
Ben Bernanke and many American policy makers take a 
minimalist view that equates with macroprudential su-
pervision and monitoring. Consequently, there is much 
less emphasis in the US on procyclicality and more em-
phasis on Too Big to Fail (Persaud 2010; Confidential 
interview with official, January 2012). The United States 
has however displayed much more willingness to embrace 
leverage ratios than countercyclical capital requirements, 
while the opposite applies in large continental European 
countries, such as Germany and France, largely due to 
heavily leveraged large banks. 
In the EU itself there have also been divisions relating 
to how Basel III should be translated into EU regulatory 
practice and statute. For example, the Fourth Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRDIV), which will implement 
Basel III in Europe raises all kind of issues and has al-
ready ignited tensions. From a single market perspective 
there is a case for having a single set of rules applica-
ble to all. On the other hand, from a macroprudential 
perspective national regulators need to be able to adjust 
requirements for countercyclical purposes. The European 
Central Bank (ECB) position is that this should happen 
under a framework of constrained discretion, in which 
prior notification is given to the new European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB), to enable the ESRB to assess the spill 
over consequences of such a move for other countries. 
The French position is to go even further, and have a 
harmonised framework at the EU level, so that national 
regulators do the same thing in the same circumstances. 
The European Commission has also argued for a rules 
based approach, in which countries will have to stick 
to a rigid set of standards. The Dutch central bank, fa-
vours the idea of the ESRB acting as the role of mediator, 
as suggested by the ECB. However, both the Bank of 
England, and Scandinavian central banks want national 
macroprudential freedom and reject the idea of having to 
make requests to the ESRB, with the Bank of England 
seeking control over tools concerning leverage, liquidity, 
funding, lending risks and margin requirements. Cur-
rently, the CRDIV is in trialogue discussions with the 
Council of Ministers, European Commission and Euro-
pean Parliament, led by the Irish presidency, illustrating 
how interstate and inter institutional disagreement is im-
peding, or at least slowing the process of macroprudential 
policy development. 
Private sector concerns and national institutional process
A final area of contestation relates to the fact, that while 
the initial acceptance of a broad macroprudential regula-
tory philosophy proceeded quite quickly and with rela-
tively little opposition during 2009, the actual detailed 
practicalities of constructing macroprudential policy is 
a far more contested process. The quantitative setting of 
macroprudential policy instruments such as countercy-
clical capital requirements have implications for the day 
to day investment strategies and market operations of a 
variety of market actors. Consequently private sector ac-
tors have been far more concerned with contesting the 
detailed setting of policy instruments, than they have 
been over broad questions of macroprudential regulatory 
philosophyy (IIF 2011). Likewise, existing institutional 
actors – legislators, political parties, other agencies and 
bureaucracies, are taking a much closer interest in and 
developing stronger positions on macroprudential in-
stitutional questions, and the powers of new macropru-
dential policy committees, as illustrated in the case of 
the EU above, as a variety of actors seek to protect their 
own turf and standing. Furthermore, national legislative 
processes that enact macroprudential for new macropru-
dential policy committees and the scrutiny surrounding 
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them, can be protracted processes. The result is a far more 
contested, contingent and even controversial sphere of 
detailed macroprudential policy development, which is 
likely to lead to political compromises and is liable to di-
lute macroprudential policy content, in substantive terms. 
Basel III provided some evidence of this. For example, the 
first scholarly account of Basel III pin points the influence 
of the Institute of International Finance (IIF) over the 
agenda and large European banks such as BNP Paribus, 
who had ‘first mover advantage’ in terms of access to the 
Basel Committee, enabling them to make the case that 
higher capital ratios would result in stagnant Euro Zone 
growth. Proposals on higher minimum capital ratios, the 
international leverage ratio, minimum liquidity ratio, and 
capital surcharge on systemically important institutions 
were all diluted in Basel III (Lall 2012: 22). Moreover, 
the powerful private Institute of International Finance 
that develops views on regulatory questions on behalf of 
many leading international banks has suggested that ‘the 
science’ in this area (macroprudential) is at an early stage, 
while using capital as an instrument of macrostabilization 
was ‘unprecedented and untested’, requiring authorities 
to ‘exercise great caution ‘ (IIF 2011: 22).
Conclusion
The five factors highlighted combine to explain why the 
task of building functioning macroprudential has been a 
slow, contested and protracted process. This article has 
highlighted how ideational change does not automati-
cally translate into significant regulatory change. The 
process of building new financial regulatory orders has 
historically been a long term process. After the Wall 
Street Crash of 1929, building the Bretton Woods or-
der was a long run process that consisted of a four phase 
process, including an interregnum phase of technical re-
finement and experimentation (Helleiner 2010), which is 
probably where we are today with macroprudential policy 
development. In this respect, the first factor explaining 
the stunted development of macroprudential regulation 
is quite simply that such a process takes time. Two fac-
tors that are specific to macroprudential regulation have 
been highlighted here. The first is that macroprudential 
is itself a technocrat project. Technical projects take time 
to develop in terms of assembling data and evidence and 
refining what are often referred to as control technologies, 
while technocrats themselves tend to be cautious, thor-
ough figures who proceed on the basis of evidence and 
data. A second issue is macroprudential’s countercyclical 
objectives. This means that it responds to the economic 
cycle. Persistent private sector deleveraging means that 
there is currently more emphasis on the enabling, rather 
than the preventative arm of macroprudential policy in-
volving efforts to encourage credit expansion. A further 
factor constraining macroprudential development is that 
key macroprudential advocates remain internally divided 
on important structural questions such as the emphasis 
given to risk weighted assets and the viability and desira-
bility of universal banking against separated or segmented 
banking. Finally, political contests over macroprudential 
points of detail in interstate terms and private sector 
reticence have acted to dilute macroprudential policy in 
substantive terms. At the same time, institutional turf 
struggles are also slowing the process of implementing 
macroprudential frameworks. Taken together these fac-
tors have to date resulted in macroprudential regulatory 
regimes that have been stunted in their development. 
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